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ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court’s animus doctrine has proven surprisingly 
adaptive. The Court has employed the doctrine not just in the typical equal 
protection context from which it arose, but also to claims that religious 
conduct or beliefs are the target of legislative hostility. Animus law and 
scholarship are flourishing after several invocations of the doctrine in the 
high Court’s recent Terms. Coinciding with these developments, gun-rights 
advocates and other supporters have increasingly railed against the hostility 
with which they believe government officials are treating the Second 
Amendment. This Essay connects these developments, mapping three types 
of gun-supporter claims that sound in an animus register: claims about 
hostility toward guns, gun owners, and gun rights. It argues, however, that 
Second Amendment doctrine should not incorporate the blossoming animus 
rationale into its methodological framework. Typical gun laws are not likely 
to arise from legislative hostility toward guns, their owners, or gun rights, 
and the customary Second Amendment framework employing motive-blind 
means–end scrutiny is sufficient to weed out any anomalous laws that may 
arise from improper motive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Government action undertaken for an impermissible purpose1 is 
ordinarily unlawful.2 A rich literature attempts to make sense of the doctrinal 
and normative significance of bad legislative intent.3 Many of those debates 
 
 1 In this Essay, I use the terms “purpose,” “intent,” and “motive” interchangeably. Though some 
scholars argue the terms are distinguishable in different ways, none of those proposed distinctions are 
relevant to this Essay’s arguments. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of 
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 426 n.40 (1996) (using the 
terms interchangeably and noting that the Supreme Court often has as well). 
 2 The Supreme Court itself has not always been clear on whether improper motive renders a 
challenged action per se unconstitutional or whether it merely heightens the scrutiny that a court should 
apply. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 
528 (2016) (describing these differing views). 
 3 See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Process Scrutiny: Motivational Inquiry and Constitutional Rights, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 2147, 2149–54 (2019) (suggesting how courts might scrutinize legislative process 
to sniff out bad legislative intent); Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 
104 VA. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2018) (arguing that discriminatory legislative intent corrodes the legitimacy 
of government); Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1785–
90 (2008) (tracing the history of purpose-based judicially enforced restrictions on legislative power and 
arguing that the Supreme Court has ignored precedential limits on its own authority to scrutinize purpose); 
Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 191, 
195–97 (2008) (justifying judicial review of legislative motive through a philosophical lens); Calvin 
Massey, The Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional Judicial Review, 59 S.C. L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(2007) (arguing that the difficulty of determining legislative purpose generally favors greater focus on 
the effects of legislation to determine constitutional validity); Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 846 (arguing similarly that courts considering constitutional challenges to 
election laws should scrutinize effects instead of purposes); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in 
Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 301–02 (1997) (noting a trend in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence toward greater scrutiny of legislative purpose and proposing possible ways forward); 
Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of 
Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 17–26 (exploring limits on the constitutional 
significance of legislative motive); J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in 
Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 954 (1978) (arguing that bad legislative motive is 
constitutionally relevant because of its potentially unfair impact on the social contract); Theodore 
Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 
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turn on practical and conceptual concerns: the difficulty of discerning 
purpose;4 how to distinguish purpose, motive, and intent;5 whether it is even 
coherent to speak of purpose for multimember bodies;6 and so on.7 Other 
debates turn on the role that the concept of intent does or should play in 
adjudicating constitutional cases.8 Yet, despite the fact that the Supreme 
Court sometimes clearly does assess motive in constitutional cases,9 far less 
scholarship has focused on just what motives or purposes actually are 
considered or ought to be considered improper or invalid.10 
Part of the reason for that lacuna is no doubt the multiplicity of bad 
reasons available to government actors. Just as the range of permissible 
government objectives is broad and diffuse,11 there are likewise many 
possible forbidden motives. And just as permissible government ends are 
inferred or derived from various sources—grants of legislative powers, the 
purposes of governmental authority, the conferral of rights themselves—the 
 
52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 39–41 (1977) (attempting to reconcile conflicting uses of bad motive and impact 
in Supreme Court jurisprudence); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in 
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1208 (1970) (arguing that bad motive’s relevance depends on the 
substantive constitutional challenge); Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of 
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 102 (criticizing Professor John Hart Ely’s 
article on legislative motive (citing Ely, supra, at 1254–61, 1281–82)). 
 4 See Ely, supra note 3, at 1220 (“Anyone who concludes that legislative or administrative motivation 
is sometimes relevant to constitutional questions will inevitably become concerned with the methodology 
by which such motivation is to be determined.”). But see Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 322 (arguing that it is 
easier for courts to determine legislative purposes than to assess governmental means). 
 5 Kagan, supra note 1, at 426 n.40 (noting the difficulty of distinguishing these concepts). 
 6 Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 
1, 11 (1992) (suggesting that understanding purpose as the aggregation of individual motivations means 
“the very idea of legislative purpose is incoherent”). 
 7 See Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 925, 925–26 (1978) (listing a series of eleven nonexhaustive questions about the role of motive in 
constitutional analysis). 
 8 Fallon, supra note 2, at 529 (arguing that, as a normative matter, bad intent ought to play a minor 
role in constitutional rights adjudication); Kagan, supra note 1, at 414 (arguing that, as a descriptive 
matter, most of First Amendment free-speech law has developed as a way to smoke out illicit motive). 
 9 Sometimes the Court assesses motives in constitutional cases despite its occasional disavowal of 
that notion. Compare, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–83 (1968) (disclaiming an 
interest in legislative motive when deciding constitutional cases), with Fallon, supra note 2, at 526 n.15 
(citing examples of motive-like inquiry despite O’Brien). 
 10 There are some exceptions. E.g., Hasen, supra note 3, at 846 (stating that “by ‘bad’ intent in the 
election law area, I mean a legislative intent to protect incumbents, a political party, or the two major 
political parties, from political competition”); Kagan, supra note 1, at 428–30 (detailing impermissible 
motives in the First Amendment context). 
 11 Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 937 (1988) (finding a broad variety of sources for 
potential government interests, including “rights described in the constitutional text, penumbras, and 
means to constitutionally specified ends”). 
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list of bad reasons can also be wide-ranging.12 To be sure, few would argue 
legislative motive is relevant to every constitutional question, or even to 
every constitutional provision,13 but when it does become relevant, the types 
of motives deemed impermissible will often depend on the underlying right 
or interest implicated.14 
But that is not always the case. Some illicit motives transcend doctrinal 
boundaries.15 One transsubstantive type of improper motive, argues 
Professor Cass Sunstein, is the “naked preference,” which he defines as the 
distribution of benefits and burdens based on nothing more than the raw 
political power of favored groups.16 Professor Sunstein in fact suggests that 
this notion of improper purpose is close to a comprehensive constitutional 
theory that explains or describes the bulk of constitutional-rights protection.17 
A related type of bad government motive that transcends particular 
contexts—and one this Essay focuses on—is government animus.18 
Animus doctrine bars the government from acting out of mere dislike—
a bare desire to harm—whether in dealing with zoning ordinances,19 
 
 12 See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 331. 
 13 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 525–27 (identifying certain constitutional domains in which the 
Supreme Court has searched for motive).  
 14 See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 330–31 (identifying various values that prohibit certain government 
purposes, such as anticaste values in equal protection, anti-parochialism in the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, and anti-ignorance and antiorthodoxy in the Free Speech Clause). 
 15 And some illicit motives that probably ought to extend beyond doctrinal boundaries—like 
invidious race discrimination—occasionally do not. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996) (holding that “[s]ubjective intentions,” such as law enforcement’s motivations based on race, “play 
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”). 
 16 Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689–91 
(1984). 
 17 Id. at 1693 (arguing that the naked-preference prohibition is “the best candidate for a unitary 
conception of the sorts of government action that the Constitution prohibits”). 
 18 Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 134 
(2018) (arguing that “animus cases represent, however haltingly or incompletely, a basic principle of 
constitutional law, namely, that officials act illegitimately when their conduct is based on wrongful 
intentions”); Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 314 (identifying animus as one type of improper purpose courts 
have looked to when invalidating statutes on grounds of motive); cf. Susannah W. Pollvogt, 
Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 900 (2012) (“As a concept that cuts across the tiers-
of-scrutiny framework, the prohibition against basing laws in animus represents the broader and more 
universal commitments of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”). 
 19 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding that requiring a 
special use permit for a home for the intellectually disabled violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
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government benefits,20 antidiscrimination law,21 or religious practices,22 
among other government actions. Hostility, in this sense, is antithetical to the 
legislature’s deliberative obligations to act for public purposes to serve the 
public good.23 In just the last few years, the Supreme Court has invoked 
animus in a variety of settings, including recent “high-stakes constitutional 
rights adjudication.”24 
In 1973, the Supreme Court first struck down a law on what would 
come to be understood as an animus rationale.25 In U.S. Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court held unconstitutional an amendment to the 
Food Stamp Act that “exclude[d] from participation in the food stamp 
program any household containing an individual who is unrelated to any 
other member of the household.”26 The amendment tragically affected many 
poor individuals living in nontraditional arrangements, including the 
plaintiffs who brought the successful challenge under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.27 
In striking down the provision, the Court acknowledged that in a typical 
equal protection case, classifications for nonsuspect classes receive only 
minimal rationality review.28 But here the provision could not be squared 
with the purposes of the Food Stamp Act itself, 29 and the legislative history 
 
 20 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (striking down a law that excluded from 
food stamps those living in a household with unrelated members). 
 21 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (striking down amendment to the Colorado 
constitution that prohibited lesbian, gay, or bisexual status, conduct, or activity from, among others, 
serving as a ground for a nondiscrimination claim). 
 22 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (overturning a state 
court adjudication against a cakeshop owner on the grounds that commissioners exhibited religious 
hostility toward the baker). 
 23 Unsurprisingly, many of those focusing on government purposes emphasize that public purposes 
are the antithesis of bad ones, whether characterized as animus, naked preferences, or forbidden 
legislative intent generally. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 
2 (2017); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1690 (“The constitutional requirement that something other than a 
naked preference be shown to justify differential treatment provides a means, admittedly imperfect, of 
ensuring that government action results from a legitimate effort to promote the public good rather than 
from a factional takeover.”); Fallon, supra note 2, at 530 (arguing that legislators have deliberative 
obligations “not to pursue constitutionally forbidden aims or to take official actions based on 
constitutionally forbidden motives”). 
 24 William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 155 (2019) (identifying cases 
concerning lesbian and gay rights and President Trump’s travel ban as examples). 
 25 See Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to Harm,” 
64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1045, 1060 (2014) (describing Moreno as the first in the line of “bare desire to 
harm cases”). 
 26 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973). 
 27 Id. at 538–40 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing the dire financial and living conditions of those 
who brought the lawsuit). 
 28 Id. at 533 (majority opinion). 
 29 Id. at 533–34. 
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showed it was “intended to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie 
communes’ from participating in the food stamp program.”30 That was the 
problem. If equal protection means anything, the Court said, “it must at the 
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”31 This 
conception of animus—as a bare desire to harm—would come to dominate 
the case law and literature. Throughout the next several decades, the Court 
would use the animus rationale to strike down laws targeting the 
intellectually disabled32 and gay and lesbian individuals33 for disfavored 
treatment, without elevating either group to suspect or quasi-suspect status. 
Animus as a theoretical rationale for improperly motivated government 
conduct is migrating.34 In Supreme Court opinions spanning the last several 
decades, the concept has leaped from equal protection doctrine35 to free 
exercise jurisprudence36 to Establishment Clause doctrine37 and then back 
again into the equal protection context.38 The concept of animus truly “is 
having its moment in the sun.”39 Scholarship on animus theory is also 
flourishing.40 Scholars have analyzed and critiqued the Court’s development 
 
 30 Id. at 534. 
 31 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 32 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
 33 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 
(1996). Similarly, the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, though not relying on traditional animus analysis of 
legislative intent, emphasized that bans on same-sex marriage “teach[] that gays and lesbians are unequal” 
and “demean[] gays and lesbians” by “lock[ing] them out of a central institution of . . . society.” 135 S. 
Ct. 2584, 2601–02 (2015). 
 34 Araiza, supra note 24, at 163 (noting that the doctrine “has migrated into other constitutional rights 
areas”). 
 35 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532–33 (1973). 
 36 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018); Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526, 547 (1993) (striking down a local 
ordinance that targeted religious meat slaughter). 
 37 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403, 2420–23 (2018) (upholding a travel ban on nationals of 
several countries and rejecting plaintiff’s allegation that the ban constituted religious animus). 
 38 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915–16 (2020) (rejecting 
the claim that termination of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program was motivated by 
unconstitutional animus). 
 39 Katie R. Eyer, Animus Trouble, 48 STETSON L. REV. 215, 215 (2019). 
 40 William Araiza has written more prolifically on the topic in recent years than any other 
commentator. See ARAIZA, supra note 23; Araiza, supra note 24; William D. Araiza, Call It by Its Name, 
48 STETSON L. REV. 181 (2019) [hereinafter Araiza, Call It by Its Name]; William D. Araiza, Response: 
Animus, Its Critics, and Its Potential, 48 STETSON L. REV. 275 (2019); William D. Araiza, Objectively 
Correct, 71 FLA. L. REV. F. 68 (2020); William D. Araiza, Regents: Resurrecting Animus/Renewing 
Discriminatory Intent, 51 SETON HALL L. REV. 983 (2021). Many other authors have also taken renewed 
interest in the topic, including those interested in applying the topic in new settings. See, e.g., Katherine 
A. Macfarlane, Procedural Animus, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1185, 1188–89, 1218–24 (2020) (developing a 
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and application of the doctrine in various settings.41 Yet the animus 
doctrine’s place in constitutional law remains hazy. It has been variously 
described as “undertheorized,”42 “confusi[ng],”43 “amorphous,”44 
“descriptively misleading,”45 and “substantively problematic.”46 Litigants 
have leveraged this lack of clarity to argue for animus-based invalidation of 
laws on quite novel theories.47 
Another development in constitutional law is occurring alongside this 
growth in the doctrinal and scholarly focus on animus: increasingly strident 
claims that government action to prevent gun violence is motivated by 
hostility to the Second Amendment.48 As one example, a recent lawsuit by 
gun manufacturer Smith & Wesson claimed that an administrative subpoena 
for select business records violated the Second Amendment because it “was 
motivated by an intent to infringe upon Smith & Wesson’s Second 
Amendment rights and chill its exercise of those rights.”49 The subpoena is 
unconstitutional, the manufacturer contended, because it arose from an 
“improper motive to undermine Second Amendment rights.”50 
This Essay connects these developments in animus jurisprudence and 
Second Amendment advocacy and litigation. It questions whether courts 
developing Second Amendment doctrine ought to borrow from animus 
doctrine in fleshing out the governing constitutional framework for Second 
 
theory of procedural animus that would invalidate laws that create undue procedural hurdles for out-
groups to vindicate their legal rights). 
 41 See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the New Minorities, 
2018 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 258–60 (critiquing the Court’s invocation and application of the animus doctrine 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop); Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 18, at 133–36 (same); Steven D. Smith, 
The Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675, 677–78 (2014) (arguing against animus 
doctrine due to its putatively negative effects on public discourse); Daniel O. Conkle, Animus and Its 
Alternatives: Constitutional Principle and Judicial Prudence, 48 STETSON L. REV. 195, 195–98 (2019) 
(critiquing animus doctrine on similar grounds). 
 42 Araiza, supra note 24, at 171. 
 43 Pollvogt, supra note 18, at 929. 
 44 Conkle, supra note 41, at 199. 
 45 Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1322 (2018). 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Araiza, Call It by Its Name, supra note 40, at 191–92 (describing several cases stretching the 
concept). 
 48 See infra Part I. 
 49 Complaint at 33–34, Smith & Wesson Brands Inc. v. Grewal, No. 20-19047 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 
2020); see also id. at 34 (“The Subpoena and related investigation are motivated by the Attorney 
General’s desire to prevent New Jersey residents from exercising their Second Amendment rights, and to 
chill citizens’ exercise of those rights, by harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs.”). 
 50 Id. at 31. 
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Amendment challenges.51 As the Smith & Wesson lawsuit makes clear, one 
way to understand the claims coming from gun-rights quarters is grounded 
in animus. Claims about government animus in the Second Amendment 
space happen at three levels: (1) as animus against guns, (2) as animus 
against gun owners, and (3) as animus against gun rights. Consider Ninth 
Circuit Judge Lawrence VanDyke’s recent opinion dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc in Mai v. United States, which aptly shows why 
these types of claims are best characterized as grounded in a concern about 
animus: 
To the rational observer, it is apparent that our court just doesn’t like the Second 
Amendment very much. We always uphold restrictions on the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Show me a burden—any burden—on 
Second Amendment rights, and this court will find a way to uphold it. . . . There 
exists on our court a clear bias—a real prejudice—against the Second 
Amendment and those appealing to it. That’s wrong. Equal justice should mean 
equal justice.52 
This Essay adds to the animus literature and treads new ground in two 
ways. First, in Part I, it identifies and assesses the types of animus claims 
that arise in Second Amendment litigation, advocacy, and scholarship. These 
claims invoke animus against guns, gun owners, and gun rights themselves. 
Second, in Part II the Essay explains and defends the irrelevance of improper 
motive to Second Amendment adjudication. It also raises questions about the 
coherence of speaking about animus against rights and concludes that the 
Second Amendment is not sensitive to the type of harms animus doctrine 
seeks to prevent. The nature of the government’s legitimate and compelling 
interest in public safety means regulations often inevitably butt up against 
the right to keep and bear arms; there’s nothing sinister or ill intentioned 
about that. The Essay concludes that animus should play no role in Second 
Amendment doctrine. The Second Amendment is not motive sensitive, and 
courts should reject these animus incantations. 
I. ANIMUS IN THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
In the context of Second Amendment rhetoric and advocacy, there are 
three types of animus claims to disentangle: (1) animus against guns, 
(2) animus against gun owners, and (3) animus against gun rights. The first 
type of argument claims that legislators act out of hostility for the 
 
 51 See Jacob D. Charles, Constructing a Constitutional Right: Borrowing and Second Amendment 
Design Choices, 99 N.C. L. REV. 333, 340 (2021) (exploring how and when constitutional borrowing is 
justified in the context of Second Amendment doctrine). 
 52 974 F.3d 1082, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2020) (VanDyke, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc) (footnotes and citations omitted) (first emphasis added). 
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constitutional instrumentality itself; the second sounds in the nature of 
traditional animus claims, of differential treatment against politically 
unpopular groups; and the third consists of claims about the right itself, that 
certain judicial or political elites denigrate and discriminate against the 
exercise of the right. Weaving these claims together is the premise that 
various governmental actors are motivated not by good faith concerns about 
safety and security but by some sort of bad faith—a type of hostility or 
animus. This Part briefly disaggregates and provides examples of each of 
these claims by examining animus against guns and gun owners in the first 
Section, and then animus against gun rights in the following Section. 
A. Animus Against Guns and Their Owners 
1. Hoplophobia Claims 
One set of animus claims invokes hostility to guns themselves. 
“[T]oday there are some people who find the mere sight of a firearm 
objectionable or terrifying.”53 These people, described as those “who have 
emotional fears of guns,”54 are often referred to as “hoplophobes” in pro-gun 
circles.55 As one gun store owner explained to self-described hoplophobe and 
journalist Philip Weiss, “[b]laming a gun for its misuse” is to irrationally 
imbue the instrument with agency; he called such a leap “modern 
witchcraft.”56 According to this view, people who think guns are evil are just 
plain irrational.57 
Those who make these accusations think this antigun bias colors 
policymaking and leads to unreasonableness or worse. When legislators 
make law from a place of hostility toward lethal weaponry, the argument 
goes, it threatens the diminution of the right itself. As Judge James Ho said, 
dissenting from the denial to rehear en banc a case involving the federal ban 
on certain interstate handgun sales, “Law-abiding Americans should not be 
conflated with dangerous criminals. Constitutional rights must not give way 
 
 53 David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational Limits on 
the Right to Bear Arms, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 203, 218 (2018). 
 54 David B. Kopel, The Licensing of Concealed Handguns for Lawful Protection: Support from Five 
State Supreme Courts, 68 ALB. L. REV. 305, 335 (2005). 
 55 Id. at 335 n.134 (“The precise term for such fears is ‘hoplophobia’ (fear of armed citizens).”); see 
also Erik Luna, The .22 Caliber Rorschach Test, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 56 (2002) (quoting a critic of a 
gun-free policy at the University of Utah who called the university’s president a “hoplophobe”). 
 56 Philip Weiss, A Hoplophobe Among the Gunnies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/11/magazine/a-hoplophobe-among-the-gunnies.html [https://perma. 
cc/UK3Z-G5X3]. 
 57 Id. (“There is . . . a hidden agenda among what I call gun prohibitionists who want to disarm the 
American people, and they’re selling the greater number of unknowing Americans that guns all by 
themselves are evil . . . .”). 
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to hoplophobia.”58 In his view, banning such interstate gun sales could only 
come from antigun animus; legislators were not acting out of public regard 
for public safety but out of an irrational bias against guns themselves.59 
2. Second-Class-Citizen Claims 
Next, some activists and advocates argue that gun owners are 
discriminated against in government action and treated as second class, 
usually in response to laws or regulations that affect the ease of gun use or 
access. Consider, for example, the statement of a gun store owner who sued 
(and partially prevailed) over a COVID-19-related shutdown order in 
Massachusetts: “We are being treated like second-class citizens because we 
sell guns.”60 Speaking of the precautions imposed on gun shops after a judge 
otherwise ruled in their favor, the owner lamented, “we feel that [the law] is 
treating us differently.”61 
Some commentators similarly argue that “[g]un owners have been 
subjected to vicious stereotypes” and are, in this sense, “no different from 
other groups who petition the courts for the protection of their rights.”62 
Those “other groups” for whom the state has shown disrespect—and to 
whom some explicitly compare contemporary gun owners—are often 
historically disadvantaged and repressed groups, like Black Americans 
fighting for racial equality.63 Often, the relationship between the Civil Rights 
Movement and gun owners is drawn expressly.64 
Some of these advocates clothe themselves in the traditional animus 
language. For instance, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, an assertive 
gun-rights-advocacy organization, characterized a Boulder, Colorado law 
raising the minimum age for firearm possession in city limits to twenty-one 
 
 58 Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 398, 405 (5th Cir. 2018) (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 59 See id. 
 60 John Hilliard, Mass. Gun Shops Reopen: ‘Second Amendment Should Not Be Suspended During a 
Health Pandemic,’ BOS. GLOBE (May 9, 2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/05/09/metro/gun-
shops-reopen-second-amendment-should-not-be-suspended-during-health-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/ 
EU88-BWB8]. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Alice Marie Beard, Gay Rights Strengthen Gun Rights, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 236 (2016). 
 63 Alan Gura, The Second Amendment as a Normal Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 223, 224 (2014) 
(“[J]ust as the struggle for racial equality did not end with Brown v. Board of Education, the effort to 
establish the Second Amendment as a normal part of the Bill of Rights was never going to unfurl a 
‘Mission Accomplished’ banner just because the Supreme Court declared that the Second Amendment 
was a fundamental individual right on par with the others.” (citation omitted)). 
 64 See, e.g., Massive Gun Resistance, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887324600704578402760760473582 [https://perma.cc/YFQ4-BUMR] (arguing that the 
“main difference” between Southern resistance to Brown and purported resistance to Heller is that now 
“the media are cheering on the politicians thumbing their noses at the law of the land”).  
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as “a blatant act of discrimination against a political minority.”65 Indeed, pro-
gun-rights politicians have repeatedly proposed or passed various 
“nondiscrimination” laws to protect gun owners. For example, in 2016, 
Maine passed “An Act To Ensure Nondiscrimination against Gun Owners in 
Certain Federally Subsidized Housing,” a law that forbids landlords leasing 
federally subsidized housing from imposing restrictions on lawful gun 
possession or use in rental units.66 And organizations have lobbied for 
broader protections for industry participants.67 Consider one proposal: 
The Firearms Industry Nondiscrimination (FIND) Act provides that it shall be 
an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to refuse to provide any 
goods or services of any kind, or to terminate an existing business relationship 
with, or otherwise discriminate against an individual or trade association, solely 
because the business or individual is engaged in the lawful commerce of 
firearms or ammunition products.68 
These arguments assume that gun regulations are not intended for the 
ostensibly compelling interest in preventing gun violence, but simply as a 
way to harass and demean gun owners.69 As (fictional character) Ainsley 
Hayes put this claim to someone in favor of gun regulation: “Your gun 
control position doesn’t have anything to do with public safety, and it’s 
certainly not about personal freedom. It’s about you don’t like people who 
do like guns. You don’t like the people.”70 
B. Animus Against Gun Rights 
Like impermissible government hostility toward unpopular minorities, 
animus claims in the Second Amendment context also often involve 
purported hostility toward the exercise of the right—of “government animus 
 
 65 Caldara v. City of Boulder: Our Freedom Includes the Right to Self-Defense, MOUNTAIN STATES 
LEGAL FOUND., https://mslegal.org/cases/caldara-v-city-of-boulder/ [https://perma.cc/3MSD-5KYW]. 
 66 2016 Me. Legis. Serv. S.P. 620 (West) (codified at 14 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6030-F 
(West 2020)). 
 67 Jonathan Shorman & Nicole Asbury, Kansas Bill Bans Discrimination Against Firearms Industry. 
It Faces an Uncertain Future, WICHITA EAGLE (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.kansas.com/news/politics-
government/article240427586.html [https://perma.cc/C9ZQ-79CW] (“The National Shooting Sports 
Foundation has pursued the anti-discrimination bill in legislatures across the country.”). 
 68 Firearms Industry Nondiscrimination Act (FIND Act), CONG. SPORTSMEN’S  
FOUND., http://congressionalsportsmen.org/policies/state/firearms-industry-nondiscrimination-act-find-
act [https://perma.cc/5GPT-8LTX]. 
 69 MATTHEW J. LACOMBE, FIREPOWER: HOW THE NRA TURNED GUN OWNERS INTO A POLITICAL 
FORCE 53 (2021) (quoting an NRA publication as decrying gun regulation proposals in the wake of the 
Columbine massacre as nothing more than a “hateful and bigoted war . . . against American firearm 
owners”).  
 70 The West Wing: In This White House (NBC television broadcast Oct. 25, 2000). 
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toward the constitutional entitlement” itself.71 These arguments that the 
Second Amendment has been downgraded from a fundamental 
constitutional guarantee to a “second-class” right are increasingly common.72 
But this is a specific type of second-class claim. After all, courts or 
legislators could be treating the right as second class through ineptitude73 or 
plain neglect.74 But the animus type of the second-class claims points to 
improper motive as the cause of the alleged disparity. 
In cataloguing various types of second-class claims in the setting of 
court decisions, Professor Timothy Zick describes an animus type of 
assertion in his classification of “ideological” claims.75 These are arguments 
about “the tone, tenor, or hostility of lower court decisions,” which claim 
“judges have viewed and treated the Second Amendment as ‘second-class’ 
owing to partisan attitudes or personal biases.”76 Although Professor Zick 
focuses on a framing of claims about the views of courts or judges, the same 
type of allegations have been leveled against policymakers as well.77 
Judges are not just the target of such claims, but also occasionally the 
accusers. Here’s Justice Clarence Thomas dissenting from the Court’s 
decision not to review a Ninth Circuit opinion upholding a waiting period 
before a handgun purchase: the court of appeal’s analysis “is symptomatic 
of the lower courts’ general failure to afford the Second Amendment the 
respect due an enumerated constitutional right.”78 Even more colorfully, 
Fifth Circuit Judge Don Willett recently claimed the Second Amendment is 
 
 71 Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J 308, 370 (2019). 
 72 Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 46 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 621, 627 
(2019) (creating a typology of second-class right claims); Joseph Blocher & Eric Ruben, “Second-Class” 
Rhetoric, Ideology, and Doctrinal Change, 110 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming March 2022) (on file with journal) 
(documenting and categorizing various types of claims that the Second Amendment is being treated as a 
disfavored right). 
 73 Something like this was almost part of New York City’s defense in the Supreme Court to its 
regulation that did not allow gun owners with a premises license to take their firearms to a second home 
outside the City. Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 
140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280) (“I think that the—the question on second homes, there, Petitioners 
have identified a difficult application of our former rule that wasn’t really contemplated when the rule 
was—was adopted.”). 
 74 Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1865 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari) (contending that the Court would have reviewed similar restrictions on free-speech or abortion 
rights but “faced with a petition challenging just such a restriction on citizens’ Second Amendment rights, 
the Court simply looks the other way”). 
 75 Zick, supra note 72, at 632–33. 
 76 Id. at 632. 
 77 Blocher & Ruben, supra note 72 (manuscript at 39) (“A close relative to claims about widespread 
judicial disrespect of the Second Amendment is the claim that policymakers (legislatures, city 
governments, and so on) are disrespecting the right to keep and bear arms.”). 
 78 Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari). 
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“spurned as peripheral,” “snubbed as anachronistic,” and “scorned as fringe” 
by those who disagreed with his understanding of its scope.79 
Just as judges level these claims against the Second Amendment’s 
perceived legislative opponents, so too do some advocates, commentators, 
and politicians. Some, for example, argue that “the Democratic Party is 
increasingly hostile to the Second Amendment.”80 Others argue that 
particular localities are.81 In opposing a bill that would expand background 
checks to private sales, the NRA intoned: “This legislation isn’t about 
making Americans safer; it’s about forwarding an anti-gun agenda that seeks 
to restrict firearm ownership in America—as much as they can, however they 
can, and as soon as they can.”82 Some scholars have connected this kind of 
rhetoric directly to that employed in animus cases.83 
A few Second Amendment cases have also revolved around animus-
like challenges. In Chicago Gun Club, LLC v. Village of Willowbrook, the 
Village of Willowbrook denied a special-use permit and variance that would 
have enabled a luxury gun store to be built in the 8,500-person community.84 
The developers of the proposed gun store sued, claiming that the decision 
violated the Second Amendment; they detailed what they described as 
procedural irregularities in the village’s consideration of the proposal and 
hostile statements by residents,85 two evidentiary indicia the Supreme Court 
 
 79 Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 396 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 80 Jacob Sullum, Democrats Reveal Their Hostility to the Second Amendment, REASON (June  
26, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://reason.com/2019/06/26/democrats-reveal-their-hostility-to-the-second-
amendment/ [https://perma.cc/FYW2-MZ88]. 
 81 Brian McCombie, There Are Many Second Amendment Supporters in California, NAT’L RIFLE 
ASS’N (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.americas1stfreedom.org/articles/2020/2/13/there-are-many-second-
amendment-supporters-in-california [https://perma.cc/9T3S-3P96] (“The current political leadership in 
California has a well-earned reputation for outright hostility to the Second Amendment and to those 
Golden State citizens who wish to exercise their right to keep and bear arms.”); Duncan v. Becerra, 366 F. 
Supp. 3d 1131, 1139 n.25 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (arguing that California’s “firearm laws are so complex as to 
obfuscate the Second Amendment rights of a citizen who intends to abide by the law”), aff’d, 970 F.3d 
1133 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021); Walter 
Williams, Virginia Gun Owners in a Second Amendment Battle, TRIB LIVE (Dec. 27, 2019, 7:00  
PM), https://triblive.com/opinion/walter-williams-virginia-gun-owners-in-a-second-amendment-battle/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z9RT-KGAB] (“I am proud of my fellow Virginians’ response to the attack on their 
Second Amendment rights.”). 
 82 Senate to Take Up Anti-Gun Legislation Soon!, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N (Apr. 5, 2013), https:// 
www.nraila.org/articles/20130405/senate-to-take-up-anti-gun-legislation-soon [https://perma.cc/QHJ7-
5YPJ]. 
 83 Blocher, supra note 71, at 371 (“The NRA, in effect, has the same position as the challengers in 
Trump v. Hawaii. The argument is that laws targeting guns (and not targeting, or not targeting enough, 
other sources of crime and mayhem) are evidence of government bias against guns.”). 
 84 No. 17-6057, 2018 WL 2718045, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2018). 
 85 Id. at *2–3. 
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has considered in canonical animus cases.86 At heart, the developers’ 
complaint was that the village denied the permits because residents did not 
like the Second Amendment: “The refusal . . . was based purely on an 
unconstitutional motive: a perceived anti-gun, anti-Second Amendment bias 
of certain residents of the Village of Willowbrook and the surrounding 
communities.”87 The Chicago Gun Club court was unsympathetic to this 
argument because it did not confront “some flagrant zoning law resolved to 
violate the Second Amendment” but instead “merely an isolated zoning 
decision to maintain the status quo.”88 It swiftly rejected the challenge.89 
Regardless of whether one agrees with the court’s decision, the case stands 
as an example of litigation that seems to invoke an animus-type rationale. 
The next Part returns to some similar cases in discussing the utility of animus 
doctrine in Second Amendment challenges.  
This Part has surveyed three types of animus claims. The next Part 
explores the different types of animus claims in the course of advancing the 
argument that government motive is irrelevant in Second Amendment cases. 
II. SIDELINING SECOND AMENDMENT ANIMUS 
This Part argues that Second Amendment doctrine ought to be fairly 
insensitive to charges of bad motive. It begins by briefly addressing the 
irrelevance of motives in the hoplophobia claims below. Then, it proceeds to 
a more in-depth discussion of animus against gun owners and turns to the 
concerns with an animus toward the right itself. 
A. Hoplophobia Claims 
Start with the hoplophobia claims. Should we take seriously a concern 
that legislation is motivated by irrational antigun bias? I don’t think so. After 
all, it is hard to see why we should care about a legislature’s attitudes toward 
guns as inanimate objects apart from its views about gun owners or gun 
rights. There are not many constitutionally protected items identified in the 
Bill of Rights—the arms of the Second Amendment, the papers and effects 
of the Fourth Amendment, the amorphous “property” of the Fifth 
 
 86 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) 
(discussing city council resolutions expressing resident concerns as part of the evidence that an ordinance 
targeted a religious practice); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) 
(stating that the government’s action appeared to “rest on an irrational prejudice” against the intellectually 
disabled).  
 87 Chi. Gun Club, 2018 WL 2718045, at *10 (quoting Complaint at 12, Chi. Gun Club, LLC v. 
Village of Willowbrook, No. 17-6057 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2017)). 
 88 Id. at *5. 
 89 Id. at *11. 
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Amendment, and perhaps the printing presses of the First Amendment.90 But 
if motive is relevant at all, it is to protect people or their use of these items, 
not any concern over the items themselves (except as property protected 
without regard to motive). As two Second Amendment scholars put it: 
[I]t seems likely that most gun control supporters [and, by extension, gun 
regulations] are concerned not with guns themselves but instead with the 
negative consequences of their misuse. In that sense, even direct gun control is 
akin not to content or viewpoint discrimination—which can trigger First 
Amendment scrutiny even when targeting otherwise-unprotected activities—
but rather to regulations targeting secondary effects. Reducing the lethality of 
confrontations and making negligent actors compensate those whom they injure 
are content-neutral in this sense. They are focused on harms, not on guns.91 
Relatedly, there does not seem anything constitutionally objectionable 
with legislative disdain for guns. So long as regulations respect substantive 
barriers protecting people and rights, even an admitted, collective antigun 
bias would not seem to offend the Constitution. One could suggest that gun 
buybacks, for example, could sometimes be motivated by a desire to 
decrease gun stockpiles out of hostility toward lethal weaponry. But because 
the buybacks are typically voluntary,92 I have never seen any colorable 
constitutional claim made against the use of government resources to fund 
them. If animus matters at all in the context of guns, it must be animus against 
gun owners or gun rights. The next Sections take up these concerns. 
B. Animus Against Gun Owners 
Existing animus doctrine helps to assess claims that gun owners are 
being treated as “second-class citizens”—that they are objects of the 
legislature’s bare desire to harm. Traditional equal protection doctrine 
focuses on just these sorts of claims, that legislators are singling out a 
particular group for unfair treatment. To be sure, gun owners are not a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class, and there are no good reasons to consider 
treating them as one. Yet neither were the “hippies” in Moreno, the 
intellectually disabled in Cleburne, or the gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
 
 90 U.S. CONST. amends. II, IV–V; see also id. amend. I (discussing freedom of the press). 
 91 Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, 
and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV 295, 346 (2016) (citations omitted). 
 92 Champe Barton, How Would an Assault Weapons Buyback Actually Work?, TRACE (Sep. 12, 
2019), https://www.thetrace.org/2019/09/assault-weapon-buyback-policy-cost-estimates [https://perma. 
cc/A4NZ-DBRM] (“While several states and cities have run their own voluntary buyback programs, only 
two nations, Australia and New Zealand, have undertaken a mandatory gun buyback.”). 
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individuals in Romer and Windsor.93 Animus doctrine is one way in which 
nonsuspect classes have been able to seek protection from targeted 
legislation that treats them unfairly.94 The rationale for the constitutional 
significance of animus is that group-based harm infliction is never a 
legitimate government purpose. 
A typical animus inquiry is often highly context dependent, probing the 
justification for a discrete government action in light of the ends asserted.95 
For that reason, this Section cannot, of course, rule out that some specific 
government action might in fact be grounded in animus against gun owners. 
Instead, this Section hopes to make three points that together suggest that we 
have no good reason to suspect gun-owner animus would occur in anything 
more than anomalous cases: (1) public safety ends motivate nearly all gun 
laws, (2) gun laws do not target gun owners as such, and (3) gun owners as 
a group have not historically been marginalized—and even laws burdening 
this group carry no negative symbolic effect or stigma. 
Professor William Araiza observes that animus concerns have long 
roots. They are grounded in the Founders’ concerns with faction and the 
Supreme Court’s later focus on impermissible “class legislation” that serves 
private and not public interests.96 These twin ideas, and the heart of animus 
doctrine, help explain why gun owners are unlikely to be the subject of 
unconstitutional legislative animus when the government enacts gun laws. 
There are two related ideas animating animus doctrine: a proscription against 
identity-based harm infliction and a prescription that government act for 
public purposes.  
One key reason not to credit the claims of the gun-rights advocates 
invoking animus is that gun laws are almost always motivated by the 
quintessential public interest. As Justice Stephen Breyer observed in Heller: 
“[A]lmost every gun-control regulation will seek to advance (as the one here 
does) a ‘primary concern of every government—a concern for the safety and 
 
 93 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (striking down a law that excluded from 
food stamps those living in a household with unrelated members); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding that requiring a special use permit for a home for the 
intellectually disabled violated the Equal Protection Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 
(1996) (striking down amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited lesbian, gay, or bisexual 
status, conduct, or activity from, among others, serving as a ground for a nondiscrimination claim); United 
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 749–52 (2013). 
 94 But see Eyer, supra note 45, at 1356–59 (arguing that ordinary rational basis review and not animus 
should be the conceptual lens with which to view the means the Court used to vindicate the interests of 
these groups). 
 95 See ARAIZA, supra note 23, at 134–35 (describing the contextual factors that influence the animus 
framework). 
 96 Id. at 3, 14–16, 28 (stating that principles underlying the bar against class legislation can be found 
in animus doctrine). 
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indeed the lives of its citizens.’”97 This interest in public safety goes far 
beyond merely whether someone is killed or physically injured. Government 
has significant and compelling interests in making the public square safe for 
its residents.98 As Heller demonstrates, this does not mean every gun law is 
constitutional. Yet it does mean that typical gun laws are not likely to be 
improperly motivated. Regulating the use of lethal weaponry is something a 
functioning government must do. Whether, for example, one agrees that 
bump stocks should be tightly regulated or that government has the power to 
ban semiautomatic assault weapons, such measures do not seem to seek the 
vindication of private or factional interests. Indeed, whether one thinks the 
laws are effective at promoting public safety ends, there is little reason to 
doubt that legislators, regulators, and the researchers they rely on believe the 
laws are. In other words, government actors are seeking legitimate ends, even 
if the laws are unconstitutional for other reasons—poor fit between the 
means and the end, for example, or simply too onerous a burden on protected 
Second Amendment rights. Recall that in Heller, the Supreme Court never 
doubted the D.C. Council’s motive for banning handguns; the law was 
unconstitutional because the Court considered a ban to be per se 
impermissible, even if it would serve the goals of decreasing gun violence.99 
One way to understand this distinction is to compare the canonical 
animus cases to a typical Second Amendment case. In cases like Moreno, 
Cleburne, Romer, and others, the Court found itself searching in vain for a 
justification adequate to support the government’s action. Whether it was 
fraud prevention,100 flood-plain protection,101 or enforcement-resource 
preservation,102 the purported rationales all appeared pretextual, as post hoc 
justifications for legislation adopted for decidedly different reasons. Poor fit 
was evidence of an ulterior motive. Not so in mine-run Second Amendment 
challenges. As all the justices, even the dissenting ones, recognized in a 
recent case concerning Wisconsin’s ban on felon firearm possession, the 
 
 97 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)). 
 98 Joseph Blocher & Reva Siegel, When Guns Threaten the Public Sphere: A New Account of Public 
Safety Regulation Under Heller, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 160–63 (2021) (conceptualizing the 
government interests in public safety). 
 99 Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (stating that, although the Court “take[s] seriously the concerns raised by 
the many amici who believe that prohibition of handgun ownership is a solution” to the problems of gun 
violence, the Second Amendment simply does not allow “the absolute prohibition of handguns held and 
used for self-defense in the home”).  
 100 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535–38 (1973). 
 101 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985). 
 102 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“Colorado also cites its interest in conserving 
resources to fight discrimination against other groups. The breadth of the amendment is so far removed 
from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.”). 
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state’s asserted interest in public safety was undeniably compelling.103 One 
dissenting justice noted that “[t]his interest is also well-illustrated in the 
history of the Second Amendment.”104 Even where judges find a lack of fit, 
they do not typically question the government’s motive or the need for 
government regulation in this context. Regulations to protect public safety 
have always coexisted with gun rights,105 further undermining claims that 
these laws are targeted at gun owners out of a bare desire to harm.106 
Second, the gun laws typically targeted with animus claims also differ 
in form from the laws struck down in the canonical animus line of cases. 
Such gun laws do things like mandate background checks before certain 
types of firearm transfers,107 impose waiting periods on gun purchases, or 
require training and good reason for carrying guns in public. None apply to 
gun owners, as such.108 Even though some gun owners may hold views that 
ground their own identities or conceptions of self in their gun ownership, the 
laws do not do so.109 This lack of targeting is significant to undermining the 
gun-owner animus claims.110 
Professor Akhil Amar’s connection between the Court’s invalidation of 
laws like those in Romer and the Constitution’s Attainder Clause helps 
 
 103 State v. Roundtree, 952 N.W.2d 765, 773 (Wis. 2021) (“As other courts in this state and elsewhere 
have done, we recognize public safety generally, and preventing gun violence specifically, as important 
governmental objectives.”); id. at 782 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (acknowledging “the unquestionably 
compelling state interest in public safety”); id. at 803 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting) (“It is indisputable that 
public safety is a compelling governmental interest.”). 
 104 Id. at 803 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting). 
 105 See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT 10, 13–14 
(2018) (describing how gun laws go back to the nation’s Founding). 
 106 One could object that these are conclusions a court reaches after assessing an animus claim and 
not ex ante reasons to reject employing the animus framework. My argument is more general, however. 
Because typical gun regulations are broadly recognized as serving important public safety interests, we 
have little reason to suspect they are really motivated by sinister antigun bias. And since we have little 
reason to think them immediately suspect, gun regulations ought not to raise the same types of concerns 
as those that distinguish citizens based on sex, race, or other protected statuses.  
 107 Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 398, 403 (5th Cir. 2018) (Ho, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 108 See Blocher, supra note 71, at 343 (“[E]ven if antigun bias were constitutionally salient, it is hard 
to show that gun rights or gun owners face the same kind or degree of animus or political-process failure 
as the kinds of claims for which constitutional law has traditionally shown special solicitude.”). 
 109 See Michael B. Siegel & Claire C. Boine, The Meaning of Guns to Gun Owners in the U.S.: The 
2019 National Lawful Use of Guns Survey, 59 AM. J. PREV. MED. 678, 682 (2020) (reporting that sixty-
three percent of gun owners strongly agreed with the statement that guns are essential to their sense of 
freedom). 
 110 Cf. N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (concluding that 
an election law was motivated by intentional race discrimination and stating that the “provisions target 
African Americans with almost surgical precision” and that the State’s “asserted justifications cannot and 
do not conceal the State’s true motivation”).  
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further make this clear.111 Romer struck down an amendment to the Colorado 
constitution that barred nondiscrimination ordinances protecting gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual individuals.112 The provision specifically provided that 
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships” could not constitute the basis of any claim for protected status 
or to nondiscrimination policies.113 Although Romer never cited or 
mentioned the Attainder Clause in its opinion, Professor Amar finds that 
provision’s premises support the majority’s reasoning because both 
emphasize invidious singling out.114 And, in making this connection, 
Professor Amar further illustrates the difference between gun laws and 
animus-motivated laws like that at issue in Romer.115 “[M]ost laws,” writes 
Professor Amar, “identify conduct rather than traits: if you do A, 
consequence B ensues. Laws based on traits—blood type or blood lines, left-
handedness or a sweet tooth, sexual orientation and so on—are different.”116 
Laws based on trait or identity are suspect. But gun laws are conduct laws; 
they do not confer identity- or trait-based disadvantages. 
Put simply, run-of-the-mill gun laws are not based on discriminatory 
animus against gun owners. That conclusion should not be surprising given 
gun owners’ longstanding political power in the United States. Gun owners 
are and have long been a politically powerful force in American politics.117 
Even with the NRA’s recent financial and political troubles, the interests of 
gun owners have been protected, expanded, and catered to in the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, especially over the past half 
century.118 Over this time period, legislatures have, at the behest of gun 
owners, expanded public-carry rights, limited or eliminated local authority 
to regulate firearms, and loosened the authorization for the use of deadly 
force outside the home through stand-your-ground laws.119 And even in 
 
 111 See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 
208–21 (1996). 
 112 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996) (describing the amendment).  
 113 Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art II, § 30b). 
 114 See Amar, supra note 111, at 225–26. 
 115 Romer considered the animus behind Colorado’s Amendment 2, a 1992 ballot initiative which, 
once passed by voters, prohibited the state’s legislature from enacting laws to protect gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual people from discrimination.  
 116 Amar, supra note 111, at 226 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633). 
 117 See, e.g., Jacob D. Charles & Brandon L. Garrett, The Trajectory of Federal Gun Crimes, 170 U. 
PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 9), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3685910 (detailing how 
the NRA was successful in defeating legislation in the 1930s). 
 118 Jacob D. Charles, Securing Gun Rights by Statute: The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Outside the 
Constitution, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 11–35), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
a=3789216 (describing this trajectory).  
 119 Id.  
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places where politicians might want to impose stricter regulations, gun-rights 
enthusiasts have successfully lobbied for preemption laws that remove local 
authority and for federal protections that limit the possibilities for more 
active regulation.120 
This leads to the final reason to suspect that animus does not undergird 
gun laws. Unlike legislation aimed at “hippies,” the intellectually disabled, 
or the LGBTQ community, which raise concerns about animus both because 
of the history confronting these groups and because of the expressive harms 
that legislative hostility brings about, neither such history nor such harms 
exist for gun owners. There is no comparable history of government 
disfavoring gun owners; in fact, there is almost the exact opposite. Nor are 
there concerning expressive effects that might attend such a history of 
mistreatment. No stigmatizing stamp of disapproval accompanies legislation 
imposing background checks on private sales or banning certain types of 
semiautomatic weapons.121 
In short, despite the claims of gun-rights advocates, there are no good 
reasons to suspect that gun laws are motivated by animus against gun 
owners—and many reasons to reject that allegation. Gun laws aim to protect 
public safety, do not target gun owners qua gun owners, and do not convey 
any moral or symbolic disapproval for gun owners, a group that has 
successfully held its own in legislatures for centuries.  
Animus concerns, after all, are concerns about process. In Professor 
John Hart Ely’s classic formulation, courts should step in to fix a 
“malfunction” in the political process that occurs either when incumbent-
protection measures “chok[e] off the channels of political change” or when 
political leaders are captured by a majoritarian group and legislate to 
“systematically disadvantag[e] some minority out of simple hostility or a 
prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest.”122 There is no 
legislative-process failure with gun laws, at least not one that disadvantages 
gun owners. Gun laws do not arise from any “simple hostility” toward gun 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 See Young, supra note 3, at 246 (arguing that expressive harms occur when “a group is 
sufficiently identifiable, cohesive, and discriminated against such that its members are likely to 
understand that they have been discriminated against in a way bearing no legitimate relationship to their 
public-spirited action, but based solely on membership in that group”). But see Doe No. 1 v. Putnam 
County, No. 16-08191, 2020 WL 7027596, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (alleging, in a challenge to 
a New York law mandating public disclosure of handgun permit holders’ names and addresses, that “if 
he were granted a firearms license and his name and address were made a matter of public record that he 
and his family would be ‘ostracized’ by the community, and that they would be excluded from 
participating in social groups or ‘groups of people’”). 
 122 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980); see, 
e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–21 (2018) (rejecting the claim that President Trump’s so-
called travel ban was predicated on animus or religious hostility). 
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owners or a bare desire to harm them. They stem from a legislative desire to 
decrease gun violence. Even if one thinks the means of accomplishing that 
aim are flawed, there’s no question that such public-safety-directed ends are 
legitimate. 
C. Animus Against Gun Rights 
Finally, what can we make of the next level of claims—that of animus 
against gun rights themselves? Unlike the claims about gun-owner animus, 
one might question whether these types of claims are properly considered 
under the umbrella of animus. Indeed, one might argue that it is not 
conceptually coherent to speak about bad motive toward conduct.123 It is true 
that these claims do not fit neatly into the Court’s equal protection animus 
doctrine, which focuses on people and not primarily on rights, interests, or 
things. But two developments seem to justify this framing: (1) the Supreme 
Court’s extension of the animus concept in other contexts, such as to claims 
that government officials harbored animus toward a person’s religious 
beliefs or practices and (2) the rhetoric around the Second Amendment. 
Recall Judge VanDyke’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Mai, 
in which he charged that members of the Ninth Circuit exhibit a “clear bias—
a real prejudice—against the Second Amendment.”124 Or the NRA’s cry that 
a proposed background-check bill was not really grounded in public safety 
concerns but was instead designed to “forward[] an anti-gun agenda that 
seeks to restrict firearm ownership in America.”125 These seem best described 
as claims of animosity toward the right. 
Ultimately, however, the label is less significant than the description of 
an improper governmental motive in enacting gun laws. The prior Section 
aimed to show how the government’s interests in gun regulations were not 
improper attempts to merely harm gun owners, and this Section focuses on 
claims that the government intentionally aims to undermine gun rights. (One 
 
 123 One could argue, for example, that government may permissibly dislike any conduct, even 
constitutionally protected kinds, and that there is therefore no such thing as bad motive with respect to 
any type of conduct. Why would it be wrong for government officials to dislike abortion or certain types 
of harmful speech or criminal defendants’ invocation of their constitutional rights? It is only the actions 
state actors take that matter. I am sympathetic to this style of argument. But I do think governmental 
intent to infringe on a constitutionally protected right—even if subtly or psychologically different than 
“animus”—is a type of hostility that might be thought to be off-limits in some contexts. In any event, this 
Section argues that, assuming the concept of animus against rights is conceptually coherent (and the 
claims from gun-rights activists certainly seem to imply it is), Second Amendment doctrine should not 
incorporate that understanding into its methodological framework. If it turns out the concept collapses on 
itself, that’s just one more reason to reject motive tests in the Second Amendment context.  
 124 Mai v. United States, 974 F.3d 1082, 1105 (9th Cir. 2020) (VanDyke, J., dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
 125 Senate to Take Up Anti-Gun Legislation Soon!, supra note 82. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
22 
could try to distinguish between an intent to interfere with the right and 
animus against the right, but that distinction is irrelevant for my purposes; 
the aim here is to assess whether bad intent should matter for adjudicating 
gun cases.) This Part argues that (1) there are no good normative 
justifications for attending to motive in Second Amendment cases, and 
(2) that the established doctrinal framework in Second Amendment cases, 
which requires no direct inquiry into government motive, is sufficient to 
condemn any laws that happen to be badly motivated.  
1. Lack of Normative Reasons to Focus on Motive 
Since animus is a type of improper government motive, it makes sense 
to step back and consider why courts engage in this motive-seeking 
enterprise at all. Although assessing motive is demonstrably important in 
protecting some constitutional rights, that “does not mean that it is relevant 
or should be an admissible consideration in all cases.”126 Rather, “[t]he extent 
to which a judicial determination of motivation is relevant to the outcome of 
a case depends on the substantive doctrine in the particular area of law 
involved.”127 That’s not just an accurate descriptive statement of Supreme 
Court doctrine; it also reflects the fact that the underlying values for 
constitutional guarantees ought to drive the questions of why and when 
motive matters. In trying to unpack what effect animus against a right should 
have, we should first consider why we care about purpose scrutiny in 
constitutional law at all. 
There are, of course, those who critique such scrutiny on conceptual or 
theoretical grounds, as foolishly searching for a fictional institutional intent 
or trying to gain insight into others’ minds that we often do not even have 
about our own.128 But there are also others who argue that, regardless of these 
concerns, courts should not—as a normative matter—focus on bad intent in 
individual rights cases. Professor Richard Fallon, for example, has recently 
argued that substantive doctrines should play the key role, focusing on a 
law’s “language and effects.”129 Professor Calvin Massey has similarly 
argued that government motive should play a more circumscribed role in 
constitutional adjudication “[b]ecause it is the real world effects of 
government action that harm or help people,” and therefore “the default 
criterion for assessing constitutional validity should be the effects of the 
 
 126 Tribe, supra note 3, at 18. 
 127 Brest, supra note 3, at 102 n.46. 
 128 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 538 (describing a way to understand collective intent). 
 129 Id. at 529. 
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challenged government action.”130 And, in the election context, Professor 
Richard Hasen has argued that bad intent should be neither sufficient nor 
necessary to invalidate legislation.131 Indeed, this emphasis on a law’s real-
world effect might be more consistent with the historical practice of judicial 
review in constitutional rights adjudication.132 
Whatever its merits in broader constitutional doctrine, in Second 
Amendment cases, there are no good normative reasons to focus on 
government motive—and plenty to ignore it. When courts and scholars 
invoke motive, there are two primary types of reasons justifying that focus: 
intrinsic and instrumental ones.133 First, intrinsic rationales point to the 
expressive meaning of bad intent. Laws that, by their very existence, express 
vile views are rightfully condemned.134 Rights that have equality dimensions 
may thus justify concern with motive.135 So, too, of course, may rights that 
can be infringed through symbolism or expressive government action 
itself,136 such as an explicit establishment of religion137 or laws expressing 
racial inferiority.138 The improper motive is itself harmful and also produces 
negative consequences for those groups demeaned or impugned.139 For this 
reason, constitutional doctrine often points to the relevance of government 
 
 130 Massey, supra note 3, at 3; see also Nelson, supra note 3, at 1856 (observing that “[e]ven under 
modern doctrine . . . it is possible that most of the Constitution’s purpose-based restrictions on legislative 
power come into play only when a statute produces certain kinds of real-world effects”). 
 131 Hasen, supra note 3, at 846. 
 132 See Nelson, supra note 3, at 1786–87. 
 133 See Kagan, supra note 1, at 506 n.256, 506–11 (describing consequentialist and deontological 
views about motive analysis). Without trying to be overly technical, I am using consequentialist and 
instrumental as synonyms to mean reasoning that relies on the outcome or result of some action; similarly, 
I am using deontological or intrinsic to mean reasoning that focuses on the rightness or wrongness of the 
action itself, without basing one’s judgment on the action’s outcome or result. 
 134 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“There is patently no legitimate overriding 
purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that 
Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial 
classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White 
Supremacy.”). 
 135 See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in 
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 931 (1994) (arguing that the equality dimension is why 
even minimal burdens on the right to vote are unconstitutional). 
 136 See Tribe, supra note 3, at 17 (recognizing that “government’s motives, or the messages conveyed 
by its actions, may at times matter even more than those of a private individual”). 
 137 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); Fallon, supra note 2, at 549–50 (noting 
the Court’s concern with expressive meaning in the Establishment Clause context). 
 138 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
 139 Young, supra note 3, at 253 (describing how improper motive in these settings causes “psychic 
pain”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
24 
motive “under constitutional provisions that consist of broad language 
invoking fairness and equality.”140 
Second, on top of intrinsic concerns, some argue that whether we appeal 
to motive should be guided by consequentialist concerns.141 These 
instrumental reasons for assessing motive suggest that the inquiry is 
important because bad motive portends bad effects.142 Professor Gordon 
Young, for example, argues that “a finding of a bad motivation animating a 
statute is a reasonably good, though not a perfect, proxy for the likelihood of 
unacceptable future consequences.”143 But if intent is only instrumentally 
valuable to help gauge effects, why do we care about it at all? As Professor 
Hasen says, “[I]t seems odd to argue for an intent test over an effects test 
when the primary means of proving bad intent is bad effect.”144 True, there 
may be other, more direct ways to assess motive, but if the goal is searching 
for bad effects, it seems preferable to take that route directly.145 
It follows that motive ought to play a smaller role for rights that do not 
implicate expressive interests or for which a direct assessment of burdens 
and consequences is easier than a search for governmental motive. Those are 
two benchmarks for when we ought to care about motive.  
Professor Laurence Tribe provides another way to consider when we 
should care about motive, focused not as much on the underlying values of 
the right itself as on the nature of the government’s action, such as whether 
the state is distributing benefits and burdens or creating general rules of 
conduct. To build that argument, he first distinguishes between two different 
kinds of constitutional principles: input and output principles.146 Input 
principles limit what factors can go into government decision-making for 
 
 140 Id. at 193–94; see also Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons 
in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 728 (1994) (using race discrimination as an example and 
arguing that “[t]wo state actions are not the same—ethically, expressively, and sometimes legally—if 
they are taken for different reasons”). 
 141 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 567 (“[T]he question of how constitutional law should respond to 
constitutionally forbidden legislative intentions should depend largely on calculations of likely costs and 
benefits.”). 
 142 See Young, supra note 3, at 198 (arguing that “people who aim at bad states of affairs are likely 
to bring them into existence”). 
 143 Id. at 260. 
 144 Hasen, supra note 3, at 870. 
 145 The most plausible justification for an instrumental reason to focus on bad motive might be when 
the concrete burdens a law imposes or the consequences it brings about are hard to measure. That could 
be true when thinking about, for example, complicated macroeconomic consequences, which may be one 
reason the Court has considered motive relevant to the Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry. See Young, 
supra note 3, at 214–15 (“The Court in the Dormant Commerce Clause cases can be taken at least to 
suggest that protectionist motives are among other features invalidating or tending to invalidate state 
laws.”). 
 146 Tribe, supra note 3, at 19. 
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otherwise valid action, such as considerations about race or a person’s 
religious views; output principles limit what outcomes can come from 
government regulation, such as the rules protecting private intimacy or the 
right to counsel.147 According to Professor Tribe, output principles are 
unconcerned with government motive: “If the output of the government’s 
conduct is to deny a defendant a speedy trial, what motivated or led to this 
denial . . . is altogether irrelevant to the threshold question of a constitutional 
violation.”148 When the government is distributing benefits and burdens 
among groups, input principles, such as concerns about motive, can be 
relevant.149 But when the government creates general rules of conduct for all 
of society, only output principles ought to matter.150 
Applying the above concepts to the Second Amendment context, 
neither intrinsic nor instrumental reasons support importing a motive 
analysis into Second Amendment doctrine. Moreover, the fact that most gun 
laws create general rules of conduct provides further reason to focus only on 
outputs. First, nothing in the text, history, tradition, or doctrine of the Second 
Amendment suggests that the right safeguards any expressive interests. The 
interests it protects are substantive and concrete.151 The “core,” “central 
component” of the right to keep and bear arms, according to the Supreme 
Court, is individual self-defense.152 As McDonald explained, “Self-defense 
is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the 
present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is ‘the central 
component’ of the Second Amendment right.”153 Even broader readings of 
the Amendment, concerned with tyrannical state power, emphasize the 
 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 35. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding a constitutional right to 
carry a gun in public); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he 
individual right to carry common firearms beyond the home for self-defense—even in densely populated 
areas, even for those lacking special self-defense needs—falls within the core of the Second 
Amendment’s protections.”). 
 152 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 630 (2008); see also Blocher, supra note 71, 
at 343 (“[T]here are good reasons to doubt that the Second Amendment, as interpreted in Heller, has the 
same animus sensitivity. The Court was clear that the ‘core’ and ‘central component’ of the Second 
Amendment is self-defense, not combatting antigun bias.” (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 630) (footnote 
omitted)). 
 153 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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substantive constraints this vision imposes, not expressive or symbolic 
ones.154 
Second, there are no compelling instrumental reasons to focus on 
government motive in Second Amendment cases. Though it is true that 
“evidence of [gun-law] effects is almost always deeply contested,”155 
assessing Second Amendment burdens and applying default standards of 
proof and burden-shifting devices is much simpler than trying to tease apart 
governmental motive for gun laws. There are also just fewer reasons to think 
gun regulations are immediately suspect. Unlike laws that target, for 
example, religious conduct,156 laws targeting guns are quite often necessary 
and in the ordinary case unremarkable.157 Some ardent gun-rights absolutists 
may dispute the notion, but the Supreme Court, legal scholars, and a broad 
swath of the American public recognize that laws targeting guns are not 
immediately suspect.158 There are some guns that civilians should not have,159 
some people that should not have guns,160 and some places in which ordinary 
people should not carry guns.161 In short, just as gun laws do not typically 
target gun owners as such, they also do not typically target gun rights as 
such.162 “If the basic lodestar of the Second Amendment is the core interest 
of armed self-defense, then one would need to show that gun regulations are 
 
 154 See Skylar Petitt, Note, Tyranny Prevention: A “Core” Purpose of The Second Amendment, 44 S. 
ILL. U. L.J. 455, 515 (2020) (“No matter what method of interpretation is used, tyranny prevention is a 
core purpose of the Second Amendment, and this purpose necessitates the protection of military weaponry 
to that end.”). 
 155 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 655. 
 156 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993). 
 157 See Brownstein, supra note 135, at 936 (“Regulating the right to marry, the right to vote, or the 
right to have an abortion raises different inferences because these activities each have particular 
characteristics that may legitimately require specific regulatory attention.”). 
 158 See Joseph Blocher & Luke Morgan, Doctrinal Dynamism, Borrowing, and the Relationship 
Between Rules and Rights, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 319, 332 (2019) (suggesting that “perhaps the 
well-documented (and in some quarters, much-maligned) reluctance of courts to exercise strict scrutiny 
in Second Amendment cases is because those courts believe that the government motive in enforcing gun 
regulations truly is public safety, rather than anti-gun bias” (footnotes omitted)); cf. David B. Kopel & 
Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1113, 1122 (2010) (“One of the reasons that strict scrutiny has been applied to racial 
classifications is the significant possibility that they may have ‘invidious[] motives.’ Certainly, there is a 
similar risk for many extant anti[-]gun laws.” (footnote omitted)). 
 159 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (outlawing most private machine-gun possession). 
 160 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (listing classes of persons barred from firearm possession). 
 161 See 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e) (barring firearms on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol). 
 162 James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty: Rights with Responsibilities and 
Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 849, 871 (2014) (arguing against any animus- or prejudice-based rationale 
for reviewing gun regulations and noting that in this context “[w]e are not suspicious of the government’s 
proposed end to protect the security of all and to prevent harm (despite the slippery slope fear that 
government seeks to disarm its citizens)” and “only a paranoid person would think that gun control 
measures reflect animus against or a bare desire to harm gun owners”). 
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motivated by a desire to prevent armed self-defense as such—rather than, for 
example, that they do so incidentally as a means of furthering public 
safety.”163 Gun-rights supporters have not attempted to carry that burden.  
Lastly, typical gun regulations proscribe general conduct of the kind 
that Professor Tribe argues should lead to a focus on outputs; they do not 
directly distribute benefits and burdens, making legislative motivational 
inputs less relevant. In sum, there are no good normative reasons to support 
a focus on government motives in Second Amendment cases. The next 
Section further argues that an emphasis on government motive has no place 
in the Second Amendment doctrine because courts employing means–end 
scrutiny that does not involve examining underlying motives can sufficiently 
weed out even those rare laws that might be improperly motivated.  
2. Means–End Scrutiny and Effects Tests Independent of Motives 
The preceding Section argued that we have no good reason to import a 
focus on bad government motive into Second Amendment doctrine. Still, the 
government cannot vindicate its concededly compelling interests by singling 
out or targeting constitutionally protected conduct.164 Just as group-based 
animus doctrines proscribe a bare desire to harm (people or their faith 
systems), so too the Constitution proscribes something like a bare desire to 
infringe.165 To echo Judge Richard Posner’s comments in reviewing an 
abortion regulation, “if a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that can 
be said on its behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for 
expressing their hostility to those rights, the burden is undue.”166 A legislative 
desire to simply undermine gun rights would not be legitimate.167 
But even in this limited context, forbidding a certain governmental 
motive does not require a doctrine focusing on it. In the free-speech context, 
laws that are grounded in what Justice Elena Kagan called “ideological 
 
 163 Blocher, supra note 71, at 374. 
 164 Tribe, supra note 3, at 7–8; see also Young, supra note 3, at 216 (noting that “the core of the right 
recognized in Roe and Casey is not to be deprived of an abortion for the sole reason that officials believe 
abortions generally immoral in early stage pregnancies” (emphasis omitted)). 
 165 See Young, supra note 3, at 261 (arguing that motive analysis is relevant for actions “‘designed 
to strike’ at a fundamental right out of disagreement with its foundational premises—for example, that 
people should be entitled to abortions in early pregnancy” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.))). 
 166 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 876, 881 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 
vacated sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000). 
 167 See Young, supra note 3, at 216 (“[T]he Court is likely to protect all fundamental rights—for 
example, to birth control or to certain family living situations—from at least those motives that simply 
would deprive one of a Court-defined right because of the official actor’s disagreement with the Court’s 
premises in recognizing the right. So action motivated by the view that the exercise of such a right is 
immoral or even simply not worth protecting would be at least presumptively unconstitutional.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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hostility” toward certain ideas run afoul of the First Amendment.168 Indeed, 
she describes the very project of free-speech law as implicitly organized 
around the goal of flushing out improper government motive using various 
doctrinal proxies that do not formally focus there.169 “Whenever hostility 
toward ideas as such . . . has played some part in effecting a restriction on 
speech, the restriction is irretrievably tainted; what has entered into the action 
commands its invalidation.”170 In other words, a bare desire to suppress 
speech because of disagreement with ideas can never operate as a legitimate 
government end, and its presence in government decision-making taints the 
entire process. This conception sounds like what courts are doing when they 
try to smoke out animus and carries the same fatal consequences as an 
animus finding. But, for the most part, express concern with motive is not 
part of the free-speech doctrinal framework. Badly motivated laws are dealt 
with through methodological frameworks that do not focus express attention 
on that motive. As in other areas, if bad intent is driving state action, 
government will naturally “have a hard time justifying” the decision, and it 
will then “be struck down by the court even under relatively deferential 
scrutiny.”171 
The Second Amendment might work similarly. Indeed, one context in 
which we might detect a proxy concern with motive is in the gun-store-
zoning context, a setting in which local decision-makers may be more 
attuned to hostile constituent attitudes and concerns about public safety may 
be more attenuated. The Seventh Circuit’s decisions in a series of cases 
reviewing changes to Chicago’s gun laws after the Supreme Court’s holding 
in McDonald are instructive here.172 They read as similar to some of the 
Supreme Court’s animus cases, with the court assessing possible government 
interests that could validate the laws and finding them wanting. Except that 
here, unlike in the animus context, the Second Amendment’s doctrinal 
framework has no formal role for a concern with motive. 
On the day after the Court decided McDonald, a Chicago city council 
committee met to decide what powers the city had to regulate guns.173 One 
alderman asked the city’s lawyers what could be done, including whether it 
was possible to regulate shooting ranges.174 After several hearings, the city 
 
 168 Kagan, supra note 1, at 431. 
 169 Id. at 414 (“First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past several 
decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.”). 
 170 Id. at 431. 
 171 Hasen, supra note 3, at 881. 
 172 See Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell I), 651 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago 
(Ezell II), 846 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 173 Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 690. 
 174 Id. 
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council adopted a comprehensive new ordinance regulating guns only four 
days after McDonald came down.175 One aspect of the ordinance was a permit 
requirement for gun possession contingent on completing a firearm-safety 
course with range training.176 But the ordinance simultaneously prohibited 
gun ranges in Chicago city limits.177 Challengers argued that the law 
infringed their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, and the court 
of appeals sustained the challenge.178  
The city could not justify its ban on the grounds that residents could 
seek training at the many ranges outside city limits, as those were 
constitutionally irrelevant.179 Because the court held firearm training to be a 
protected component of the Second Amendment right,180 the ordinance could 
only be upheld if the city showed a strong connection between the law and a 
substantial public interest.181 The city asserted interests in avoiding accidents 
and limiting attractive locations for thieves, but the city provided no evidence 
to show the link between those interests and the ordinance.182 One other 
interest the city asserted—a risk of lead remaining on gun users’ hands—
could not, the court said, “be taken seriously as a justification for banishing 
all firing ranges from the city.”183 For the Seventh Circuit panel, Chicago’s 
concern about lead remnants rang about as true as the City of Cleburne’s 
concern for the flood plain.184 “To raise it at all,” the court said, “suggests 
pretext.”185 
Noting the “obvious contradiction” between the requirement that one 
obtain range training to get a permit and the ban on all ranges in the city,186 
the court’s opinion might be read as a way of flushing out the true motives 
of the city council. Much as traditional animus cases like Moreno, Cleburne, 
and Windsor assess and reject other possible purposes served by the 
challenged government action, so too the Seventh Circuit marched through 
 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 691. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 695, 711. 
 179 Id. at 697. 
 180 Id. at 704. 
 181 Id. at 708–09. 
 182 Id. at 709. 
 183 Id. at 710. The city only pressed this justification in the trial court, not on appeal. See id. 
 184 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985) (“This concern with 
the possibility of a flood, however, can hardly be based on a distinction between the . . . home [for people 
with intellectual disabilities] and, for example, nursing homes, homes for convalescents or the aged, or 
sanitariums or hospitals, any of which could be located on the . . . site without obtaining a special use 
permit.”). 
 185 Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 710. 
 186 Id. at 705. 
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and rejected the city’s purported justifications. Judge Ilana Rovner put the 
point bluntly in her concurrence: 
The ordinance admittedly was designed to make gun ownership as difficult as 
possible. The City has legitimate, indeed overwhelming, concerns about the 
prevalence of gun violence within City limits. But the Supreme Court has now 
spoken in Heller and McDonald on the Second Amendment right to possess a 
gun in the home for self-defense and the City must come to terms with that 
reality. Any regulation on firearms ownership must respect that right.187 
To paraphrase Judge Rovner, although the city can regulate based on 
gun harms, it cannot enact laws grounded in animus against the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms.188 Several years 
later, the Seventh Circuit struck down the city’s revision of its zoning laws 
in response to Ezell I.189 In place of banning gun ranges, the city created “an 
elaborate scheme of regulations governing” where they could be located.190 
Yet again, the court found the purported justifications for these restrictions 
wanting.191 And, like before, Judge Rovner was direct: “It is no secret that 
the City of Chicago would prefer to reduce the number of guns in 
Chicago.”192 But the traditional tools of heightened scrutiny allowed the 
majority to dispense with any inquiry into what motivated the city council’s 
action or doctrinal conclusion that turned on such a finding, even though 
these cases paralleled some of the animus cases in the search for adequate 
justification. 
Consider also Teixeira v. County of Alameda.193 There, gun-shop 
developers sought to build a gun store and complied with all county zoning 
requirements except one: the building they selected was just shy of the 500 
feet from a residentially zoned district that the county code required for gun 
stores.194 The zoning board of adjustment voted to grant a variance, but the 
county board of supervisors overruled the variance after a challenge from 
residents who “are opposed to guns and their ready availability and therefore 
believe that gun shops should not be located within [their] community.”195 
 
 187 Id. at 715 (Rovner, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 188 See id. at 712 (describing Chicago’s contradictory regulations as “a thumbing of the municipal 
nose at the Supreme Court”). 
 189 Ezell II, 846 F.3d 888, 889–90 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 190 Id. at 890. 
 191 Id. at 895 (“We certainly accept the general proposition that preventing crime, protecting the 
environment, and preventing fire are important public concerns. But the City continues to assume, as it 
did in Ezell I, that it can invoke these interests as a general matter and call it a day.”). 
 192 Id. at 898 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 193 873 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), on reh’g, 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 194 822 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 873 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 195 Id. (alteration in original). 
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The initial appellate panel found that the lower court should have subjected 
the claims to heightened scrutiny because the county’s decision burdened the 
right to engage in firearms commerce. The majority described its concern 
over the county’s “attempt to restrict the ability of law-abiding Americans to 
participate in activity protected by the Second Amendment.”196 Here, too, the 
standard methodological framework of heightened scrutiny proved sufficient 
for upholding Second Amendment rights, rendering any search for anti-gun-
rights animus unnecessary.197 
The right to keep and bear arms does not undermine or negate the 
legitimacy of the government’s compelling interest in public safety. Rather, 
some means of vindicating that interest are limited, and some burdens the 
government imposes are too great.198 This will, of course, turn on definitional 
questions about the scope of the right, as Texeira demonstrates.199 There is, 
in short, no escaping the fact that “rights are conceptually interconnected 
with . . . governmental powers.”200 Calls to focus on burdens and effects, 
then, properly shift the focus to questions about what constitutes 
infringement and what methods the state uses to reach its compelling goals. 
The standard two-part framework adopted among courts of appeals 
incorporates this focus on burden and effects.201 In that framework, courts 
first assess whether a particular law burdens Second Amendment rights. If it 
does, courts impose some type of heightened scrutiny. In most cases, the 
 
 196 Id. at 1063; see id. at 1061 n.7 (“Following Heller and McDonald, it is doubtful that an ordinance 
whose true purpose and effect was to eliminate access to firearms for law-abiding citizens could survive 
scrutiny.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The en banc court later vacated the decision 
and concluded that the gun shop developer did not plausibly allege any violation of a customer’s right to 
purchase firearms and could not raise his own Second Amendment claim. See Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 679–
80. 
 197 See Kopel & Cramer, supra note 158, at 1124 (“To recognize that some gun control laws have 
invidious purposes is not to say that all or even most of them do. Heightened scrutiny is the right tool for 
identifying the ones that are invidious.”). 
 198 Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 336 (noting that, with respect to abortion restrictions, the 
government interest in protecting fetal life is legitimate but cannot involve preventing a woman from 
choosing to have an abortion); Brownstein, supra note 135, at 883 (describing the rule from Casey as 
establishing that “the state cannot attempt to further that goal [(i.e., protecting fetal life)] by substituting 
its choice favoring birth over abortion for the choice of the woman by deliberately hindering her ability 
to effectuate a contrary decision and obtain an abortion”). 
 199 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and Governmental Powers, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 363 
(1993) (arguing that “within our constitutional practice, rights depend pervasively on judicial assessment 
of the appropriate scope of government power”); Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 366 (“With abortion rights, 
the Court’s leading decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey present together a classic 
example of the way in which the definition of a constitutional right is inextricably tied to the identification 
of permissible and impermissible governmental purposes.”). 
 200 Fallon, supra note 199, at 344. 
 201 For a discussion of the two-part framework and its application, see Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 
816, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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rigorousness of the review turns on the nature of the burden. If the burdens 
are great, the government must show a closer fit between the law and its 
compelling interest in public safety. If the burdens are slight, courts become 
more deferential.202 
Although talk about government interests often sounds like talk about 
purposes, in truth the normal tiers of scrutiny have hardly any independent 
inquiry into motives.203 Means–end scrutiny204 or the focus on the fit between 
the government action and the ends sought are not at all “dependent on 
underlying motives.”205 When motive matters to constitutional law, notes 
Professor Young, it imposes a separate and independent hurdle to the means–
end framework characterized by the tiers of scrutiny.206 Courts do not need 
such a test to assess Second Amendment challenges. 
To be clear, this Essay does not argue that no gun laws have ever been 
badly motivated, or even that gun owners have never been targeted by some 
government action. But the doctrine ought to be built for the paradigm cases 
of rights violation,207 and the paradigm case of Second Amendment 
violations—like in Heller—exists when the government burdens the right 
more than is necessary to vindicate its exceptionally strong interests in public 
safety. Besides, even if a law does arise from a bad motive, the doctrine’s 
typical tools are sufficient to condemn that legislation without a resort to 
direct inquiry into the legislature’s motivation.  
 
 202 See Brownstein, supra note 135, at 894 (noting that “[t]he most basic framework for identifying 
infringements focuses solely on the effect of state action”). Professor Alan Brownstein identified this 
effects-only scheme with a bifurcated standard of review that applied either strict scrutiny or minimum 
rationality review depending on whether the burden is substantial. But he recognized that an effects-based 
test can have three tiers and indeed presaged the two-part framework used in Second Amendment cases: 
In theory, the Court could elect to utilize a three-tier model of this kind while continuing to focus 
exclusively on the effects of state action. Laws imposing de minimis burdens would receive 
minimum rationality review, regulations resulting in a more substantial impact would be reviewed 
under an ad hoc balancing test, and strict scrutiny would be reserved for egregious restrictions 
such as total prohibitions on the exercise of a right. 
Id. at 909. 
 203 See Young, supra note 3, at 210–11. 
 204 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1972) (discussing and defending an approach to 
equal protection that focuses on the fit between means and ends). 
 205 Young, supra note 3, at 211. 
 206 Id. at 213. 
 207 See Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights As Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 114 (2018) (arguing 
that “how a constitutional community adjudicates rights should follow not from any mysticism about the 
particular rights at stake or about rights in general but rather from the paradigmatic forms of mischief the 
community wishes to confront”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Animus doctrine provides a useful way to enforce the constitutional bar 
against state action motivated by hostility toward out-groups. But it also has 
been employed in other contexts; this Essay suggests that many claims in the 
Second Amendment space sound in animus. At the same time, the Essay has 
argued that none of the types of animus-related claims made about guns, gun 
owners, or gun rights ought to translate into a role for motive analysis in 
Second Amendment cases. The standard framework is working to weed out 
outlier laws that substantially burden protected self-defense interests. 
  
